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Abstract
We document that firms in eight East Asian countries and Japan diversify into more
segments and engage into more related businesses¾as measured by the degree of vertical
relatedness and complementarity¾than firms in the USA. Using data for the 1990-6
period, we observe a trend towards complementary diversification in the United States and
the eight East Asian countries, and a trend towards more vertical integration in Japan. The
increase in relatedness for US firms is due to the divestiture of unrelated assets. In contrast,
the increase in relatedness for firms in Japan and East Asia is due to expansion into related
businesses. We also document the valuation effects of the diversification level, vertical
relatedness and complementarity. We observe that diversification hurts the valuation of
East Asian firms less than the valuation of firms in the Unites States and Japan. However,
vertical diversification hurts the valuation of companies in East Asian more than the
valuation of USA and Japanese firms. Complementary diversification is not detrimental to
corporate value, and even enhances value in the USA, Japan, Korea, and Singapore.
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1. Introduction
While a substantial literature has emerged on the valuation effects of corporate
diversification in developed as well as developing countries, we still know little about how
firms diversify and which types of diversification have the largest effect on corporate
value. In light of the strong evidence that corporate diversification hurts firm valuation in
the US,1 a number of recent studies have investigated the effects of diversification and
found mixed evidence on the valuation effects of diversification in the international
context.2 A criticism of these studies is that they do not document the precise nature of
diversification, both across countries and over time. In this paper we offer two extensions
to the literature. First, using data for the United States as a benchmark, we document the
diversification patterns of corporations in Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia,
the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand. Prior studies for the US and other
countries have only used the number of segments to measure diversification levels. In this
study, we distinguish between vertical and complementary diversification and study the
differences in the types of diversification across the eight East Asian countries, Japan, and
the United States, and the changes over time. Second, we investigate which types of
diversification influence firm valuation in these countries, and what the magnitude of this
valuation effect is.
We accomplish the first objective by documenting the degree of vertical and
complementary diversification in the ten sample countries. We use the inter-industry
commodity flow data in the 1992 input-output table for the US as a common benchmark to
construct vertical relatedness and complementarity indices between the primary and the
secondary businesses of all firms. These measures allow us to describe the degree of
vertical diversification, joint procurement, and/or sharing marketing and distribution
channels for any pairs of businesses in each firm.3
We find that firms in East Asia and Japan diversify into more segments and gear towards
more related diversification, as measured by vertical relatedness and complementarity, than
US firms. We show that corporations in the United States have adopted more focused
corporate strategies over time. We also observe a trend towards complementary
diversification for US and East Asian firms and vertical diversification for Japanese firms.
The increase in relatedness for US firms is due to the divestiture of unrelated assets. In
contrast, the increase in relatedness for firms in Japan and East Asia is due to expansion
into related businesses. To accomplish the second objective of the paper, we analyze the
impact of the number of segments, vertical relatedness and complementarity on firm
valuation. A monotonically decreasing valuation as a function of the number of segments
is documented for US and, to a lesser degree, Japanese firms. Our regression results also
show significant diversification discounts for Singapore, Taiwan and Indonesia. We find
1 See Lang and Stulz (1994), Comment and Jarrell (1995), Berger and Ofek (1995), Servaes (1996),
Scharfstein and Stein (1997), Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997), and Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (1999), among
others.
2 See, for example, Fauver et al., 1999 and Lins and Servaes (1999a, 1999b).
3 Complementarity is broader than horizontal diversification in that the latter only covers diversification in
the same industry.2
no evidence of diversification discounts for the other East Asian countries, especially for
firms with more than two segments. The overall results suggest that diversification of East
Asian firms does not necessarily diminish value as it does for US firms. These findings
challenge the conventional wisdom on the costs and benefits of diversification, as the
results for US firms do not generalize to most other countries.
We show that vertical diversification hurts valuation in Korea, Malaysia, and Indonesia. In
contrast, excess values increase with vertical relatedness in Japan, Hong Kong, and the
United States. We do not observe any systematic relation between complementary
diversification and excess value in the univariate comparative statistics. The regression
analysis reveals, however, that complementary diversification is generally not detrimental
to corporate value. In fact, it increases value in the United States, Japan, Korea, and
Singapore. The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 documents the data sources. In
Section 3, we construct our relatedness measures and document patterns of diversification.




Our primary data source for East Asian corporate information is the Worldscope database,
which contains financial and segment information on publicly traded companies from 51
countries.4 We selected all companies from the nine countries covered by the September
1991-8 CD-rom version of annual Worldscope database. The 1991-8 Worldscope database
covers firms from 1990 to 1997, and we select firms with fiscal year ending from January
1990 to December 1996. We do not use sample firms whose fiscal year ends outside this
range. In each CD-rom, Worldscope provides current and historical financial data and
current segment data. Since we frequently encounter missing segment information, we
collect additional segment data from the autumn edition of the 1994-8 Asian Company
Handbook and Japan Company Handbook. All financial data were converted to US dollars
using fiscal year end foreign exchange rate.5
The disclosure requirements for segment information in East Asia differ significantly
across countries (Table A1). The accounting standards regulatory bodies in Hong Kong,
Japan, Malaysia, and Singapore all have guidelines that require compliance with the
International Accounting Standard (IAS) No. 14, except on the disclosure of segment
assets. Publicly-traded companies report sales, net income, and operating expenses for each
segment that accounts for more than 10 percent of total sales. Some industries are,
however, exempted from reporting. For example, banking and shipping companies listed
4 The database has been used in La Porta et al. (1997), Fauver, Houston, and Naranjo (1999), and Lins and
Servaes (1999a, 1999b).
5 Worldscope, the Asian Company Handbook and the Japan Company Handbook provide information on
whether all subsidiaries are consolidated, whether consolidation covers only the most significant subsidiaries,
or whether the report is on a cost basis (unconsolidated). If a company changes its consolidation practice,
this change is also recorded in the data. Since non-consolidated companies are a relatively small fraction of
all firms (23% on average) and to increase sample size, we include all firms in the sample.3
on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange do not report segment information. Corporations (listed
as well as unlisted) in Korea are required to report segment information on sales revenues
and operating expenditures, while corporations in Taiwan are required to report sales
revenues and net income by segment. Listed companies in Indonesia and Thailand are
required to report sales revenues and net income. Finally, Philippine companies report only
sales revenues by segment. Since sales revenues are the only variable consistently reported
in the ten sample countries, we use it to weigh the relative importance of each segment.
For US firms, we use the Compustat financial data. Segment data are obtained from the
Compustat Industry Segment (CIS) database.6 From the CIS database, we select all
companies in the United States from 1990 to 1996. We exclude firms with missing
segment Standard Industry Classification (SIC) codes and sales, and firms primarily in the
finance sector (SIC 6000-6999). In addition to segment financial data, Compustat assigns a
four-digit SIC code for each segment according to the segment’s business description.
Since we only have two digit information for most East Asian firms, we define segments at
the two digit SIC code level. Accordingly, we aggregate segment sales to the two digit SIC
level. This procedure involves two steps. In the first step, we assign two digit SIC codes
reported by Worldscope to appropriate segments. As Worldscope reports SIC codes and
segment data separately, we do a manual matching. For some companies, the number of
reported SIC codes is not the same as the number of reported segments. If a segment
cannot be associated with a single code, we determine the segment’s code according to its
business description. If a segment is associated with multiple codes, it is broken down
equally so that each segment is associated with one SIC code.
We classify firms as single segment if at least 90 percent of their total sales are derived
from one two digit SIC segment. Since we require that each segment have sales volume,
the consolidation of accounting data does not affect our segment-level analysis. Following
on Fauver et al. (1999) and Lins and Servaes (1999a) we classify firms as multisegment if
they operate in more than one two digit SIC code industries and none of their two digit SIC
code segments accounts for more than 90 percent of total firm sales. We then define the
primary segment of a multisegment firm as the largest segment by sales. The remaining
segments are defined as secondary segments. In a small number of cases the two largest
segments have identical sales. We select the segment with the lower two digit SIC code as
the primary segment. We exclude multisegment firms from the sample when they do not
report segment sales and we also exclude firms whose primary business segment is
financial services (SIC 6000-6999). This is because segmental financial figures are not
comparable to those of non-financial firms. We keep firms that have secondary financial
segments in the sample since the problem of incomparability is less severe for these firms.
More importantly, finance segments can be vertically or complementarily related with the
primary segments, and we need to capture this relatedness. To increase sample size, we do
not enforce a minimum size threshold for firms to be included in the sample.
2.2 Summary statistics
Table 1 reports summary statistics for multi- and single segment firms between 1990 and
1996 for the ten countries, sorted by per capita GNP. For the ten countries combined, there
6 Beginning in the fiscal year ending December 15, 1977, FASB No. 14 requires that multi-industry firms
must disclose industry segment information on sales, assets, operating profits, depreciation, and capital
expenditures if the segment comprises more than 10 percent of consolidated sales, assets, or profits.4
are 16,522 (31 percent) multisegment firm-years and 36,460 (69 percent) single segment
firm-years in our sample. US firms drive this pattern, however, as East Asian and Japanese
firms diversify more than US firms. If we exclude US firms, then the ratio becomes 8,697
(65 percent) multisegment firm-year observations and 4,729 (35 percent) single segment
observations. Among the Asian countries, Japanese firms comprise the majority of the
sample¾76 percent of multisegment firms and 68 percent of single segment firms.
Looking at patterns for each East Asian country separately, Singapore and Malaysia rank
high in the percentage of multisegment firms (72 and 70 percent, respectively), while
Thailand and the Philippines have the lowest percentage (26 and 33 percent, respectively).
The US is ranked as the lowest in the percentage of multisegment firms (20 percent).7
The average size of multisegment firms including the US (excluding the US) is US$2,822
(US$ 2,331) million in total assets and US$827 (US$1,773) million in total assets for
single segment firms. For the nine East Asian countries, the average assets of multisegment
firms are mostly larger than those of single segment firms, with the exception of Korea and
Singapore. Of the multisegment firms, Japanese firms have the largest average assets
(US$2,796 million), followed by Korean and Hong Kong firms. Of the single segment
firms, Korean firms have the largest average assets (US$2,338 million), followed by
Japanese and Hong Kong firms. If we include US multisegment firms, then they have the
largest asset (US$3,365 million), but US single segment firms are ranked sixth. This
evidence is consistent with the general perception that diversified US firms are large, while
US single segment firms are on average smaller than their foreign peers. In these
comparisons, we do not observe a clear pattern of different degrees of diversification
across countries at different levels of development, even though the sample spans countries
with 1997 per capita GNP varying from Japan (US$37,850) to Indonesia (US$1,110).8
3. Construction of the relatedness variables
So far, our analysis does not control for the type of diversification. In particular, firms can
diversify into related and unrelated activities and related activities can be vertical or
complementary. In this section, we follow the methodology of Fan and Lang (2001) who
provide us with detailed information of the construction of vertical and complementary
measures in both industry and firms levels.
3.1 Relatedness variables at the industry level
Following the approach of Lemelin (1982), we construct inter-industry relatedness
coefficients, using the 1992 Use Table of Benchmark Input-Output Accounts for US
Economy.9 The Use Table is a matrix containing the value of commodity flows between
7 Since we do not enforce a size threshold for US firms, the 20 percent share of multi-segment firms is likely
understated.
8 This contrasts with the internal markets hypothesis, as advanced by Williamson (1985) and followed by
Gertner, Scharfstein and Stein (1994), Stein (1997), and Fauver, Houston and Naranjo (1999) among others,
which would suggest that firms in less-developed countries diversify more to reap the benefits of internal
markets.
9 We only have the US Input and Output table and use it as a proxy for the East Asian countries. The benefit
of using individual country tables is not obvious for two reasons. First, it is generally difficult to compare
input-output data across economies. Viet (1994) reviews methods used in input-output table compilation in5
each pair of roughly 500 private sector intermediate input-output industries; it reports for
each pair of industries i and j, the dollar value of i’s output required to produce industry j’s
total output, denoted as aij.10 The Bureau of Economic Analysis updates the Use Table
every five years. In this paper, we use the 1992 Use Table to construct relatedness
variables.
Vertical relatedness
A vertical relatedness coefficient measures the opportunity for an industry to integrate
forward and/or backward into another industry. We provide an example to illustrate how
the vertical relatedness coefficients are constructed. We take the plastics and the bags (non-
textile) industry in the United States as an example. In 1992, the total plastics output was
$31,502 million. The total output of bags was worth $8,389 million. The bags industry
consumed $1,259 million worth of plastics (aij), whereas the plastics industry employed
$10 million worth of bags (aji) as an input. On a per-dollar basis, the bag industry
consumed $0.15 (= 1,259/8,389) worth of plastics for each dollar of bags produced (vij),
whereas the plastics industry consumed $0.0003 (=10/31,502) worth of bags for each
dollar of plastics produced (vji). The vertical relatedness between the two industries is
0.0751 (Vij=1/2(vij+vji)), the average input transfer between the two industries on a per
dollar basis. Vij can be intuitively interpreted as a proxy of the opportunity of vertical
integration between industry i and j.
Complementarity
A complementarity coefficient measures the opportunity for two industries to complement
each other in procurement and marketing. To construct complementarity coefficients, we
need to measure how related industries’ i and j share output and input. We compute for
each industry the percentage of its output supplied to each intermediate industry k, denoted
as bik from the Use Table. For each pair of industries i and j, we compute the simple
correlation coefficient between bik and bjk across all k except for i and j. A large
correlation coefficient in the percentage output flows suggests a significant overlap in the
markets to which industries i and j sell their products. For each pair of industries i and j, we
also compute a simple correlation coefficient across industry input structures (all k except
for i and j) between the input requirement coefficients vki and vkj of the two industries. A
large correlation coefficient between the two suggests a significant overlap in inputs
required by industries i and j.
We define the complementarity coefficient as the average of the two correlation
coefficients, i.e., Cij = ½[corr(bik,bjk) + corr(vki,vkj)]. Cij serves as a proxy for the degree
over fifty countries in the 1970s and 1980s. He identifies numerous factors that make country tables
incompatible. The incompatibility arises from different statistical units and/or industry classification systems
employed, different treatment of secondary products, private final consumption, government expenditures,
imports and exports, and so on. Second, the quality of input-output data prepared by less developed countries
is often suspicious (Bulmer-Thomas, 1982). The most serious problem is the availability of appropriate data.
Applying the US input-output data to the Asian economies assumes that the input-output relations of
industries are similar between the US and the Asian economies. Although naïve, the assumption is not overly
strong. In an early study, Simpson and Tsukui (1965) compare the 1947 US input-output table with the 1955
Japan input-output table. They demonstrate that, although the economic systems of Japan and the United
States are very dissimilar, they contain almost identical industry patterns.
10 See Lawson (1997) for details.6
of complementarity between industry i and j. We use the plastics and the paperboard
containers industry in the United States as an illustration. The correlation of output flows
between the two industries is 0.2940 (corr(bik,bjk)), whereas their correlation of input flows
is 0.0384 (corr(vki,vkj)). The complementarity coefficient between the two industries is
calculated as the average of the input and output flow correlations, 0.16
(=0.294+0.0384)/2).
3.2. Relatedness variables at the firm level
In the previous section we construct relatedness coefficients at the industry level. To
construct firm level measures, we impute intersegment relatedness from the industry level
relatedness coefficients since the intersegment transfer data of firms are not available. The
segment classifications for US, Japanese, and East Asian firms are given by the SIC code.
The industry relatedness measures are constructed from the Use Table, where each industry
is classified by an IO (input-output) code. Before linking to segment data, the relatedness
coefficients are calculated at the 2-digit SIC level, i.e., we compute mean relatedness
coefficients for all pairs of IO industries classified into a pair of 2-digit SIC codes. The
conversion between IO and SIC codes is based on the conversion table provided by the
Bureau of Economic Analysis (see Lawson, 1997). The two firm level relatedness
variables (firm level V and C are without subscripts, industry-wide V and C have subscript
ij) are defined as follows:
V=Sj (wj*Vij), and
C=Sj (wj*Cij),
where wj is the sales weight equal to the ratio of the jth secondary segment sales to the total
sales of all secondary segments of the firm; Vij and Cij are the vertical relatedness and
complementarity coefficients associated with the pair of IO industries to which the primary
i and the jth secondary segment belong. The relatedness coefficients are each weighted by
wj and summed across all j to obtain the firm level relatedness variables, V and C.11 As a
robustness check, we also calculate the weight wj as the ratio of the jth secondary segment
sales to the total sales, i.e., of all secondary segments plus sales of the main segment, thus
taking the size of the main segment into consideration. Similar results are obtained using
this new measure (not reported).
3.3. Summary statistics
We use summary statistics on the number of segments, degree of vertical relatedness,
complementarity in each country to analyze cross-country differences in diversification
patterns. In Table 2, we report mean, median, standard error, minimum and maximum of
number of segments (Panel A), vertical relatedness (Panel B) and complementarity
11 The V and C measures are incremental (or marginal) to the main segments. We are able to identify two 4-
digit SIC codes for individual segments for US firms, hence we can construct V and C for the main segments
if we naively assumed that each 4-digit SIC code takes up half of sales in the main segment. Combining
incremental V and C with those of the main segments, we could proxy for the average V and C for US firms.
However, we do not have the same information for East Asian firms as we only observe one 2-digit SIC code
per individual segment.7
(Panel C) among multisegment firms in the ten countries sorted by their 1997 per capita
GNP. Panel A reports that Malaysia has the highest average number of segments, followed
by Singapore and Hong Kong. The United States has the lowest average number of
segments, followed by Thailand and Korea. Panel B reports that Thailand has the highest
average degree of vertical relatedness, followed by Singapore, Hong Kong and Indonesia.
The US is ranked as second from the bottom after Taiwan in average degree of vertical
relatedness. Panel C reports that Indonesia has the highest average complementarity,
followed by Singapore, Hong Kong and Thailand. Malaysia has the lowest average
complementarity, followed by Korea, the United States, and the Philippines. Consistent
with Table 1, the evidence in Table 2 suggests that, among multisegment firms, US firms
on average diversify less than firms in East Asia and Japan. They also have lower
intersegment vertical relatedness and complementarity.
Table 3 reports the number and percentage of multisegment firms by their number of
segments (Panel A), vertical relatedness (Panel B) and complementarity (Panel C). Panel A
documents that 62 percent of US firms have two segments, while the highest percentage of
firms with two segments among East Asian countries is 54 percent for Thailand. Panel B
documents that 77 percent of US firms have a vertical relatedness measure less than 0.005,
less than the percentage of firms in Taiwan (87 percent) and about equal to that in the other
East Asian countries, except for Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia and Thailand. These
later four countries have a more disperse distribution. For example, 50 percent of Thai
firms and 44 percent of Hong Kong firms have a vertical relatedness measures greater than
0.005. Panel C documents that 80 percent of US firms have a complementarity measure
less than 0.2, similar to firms in Taiwan, Korea, and the Philippines (81, 83, and 83 percent
respectively). Other countries have a more disperse distribution. For example, between 53
and 62 percent of Hong Kong, Indonesian, Singaporean and Thai firms have a
complementarity measure less than 0.2. This evidence suggests that, as compared with East
Asian and Japanese firms, the predominant pattern for US firms is to diversify into one or
two segments which are relatively unrelated to their main business segment, either
vertically or through complementarity.
Table 4 reports time series (1990 to 1996) on number of segments, vertical relatedness and
complementarity. The sample used to count the number of segments include single- and
multisegment firms, while we only include multisegment firms to compute vertical
relatedness and complementarity measures. Since for most East Asian countries, with the
exception of Japan, we have a small sample size prior to 1993, we combine these eight
countries. Consistent with Lang and Stulz (1994) and Comment and Jarrell (1995), Panel A
of Table 4 shows that the number of segments decreases over time for US firms, and that
decrease is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Interestingly, the number of
segments increases in Japan during 1990-6, with this trend being less pronounced during
the latter part of the period (1993-6). The number of segments does not change
significantly for other East Asian companies, but there is an upward trend starting in 1993.
It should be noted, however, that the number of observations is limited in the earlier
period, i.e., the overall trend for East Asian countries should be treated with caution.
Table 4 also reports time series for the vertical relatedness measure. Panel A indicates that
the mean vertical relatedness increased between 1990 and 1996 for Japanese firms, but not
for firms in the United States and the other East Asian countries. The median measures
reported in Panel B do not show any statistically significant trend. Table 4 lastly reports
time series on the degree of complementarity. Complementarity increases over the 1990-68
period for US firms, and over the 1993-6 period for Japanese and other East Asian firms.
The overall results suggest a more focused corporate strategy for US firms, with smaller
number of business segments, and a relatively greater degree of complementarity. For
Japanese firms, we observe a higher degree of vertical diversification throughout the
period, and also an increase in complementary diversification in 1993-6. For the other
eight East Asian countries, we observe a mild trend towards complementary diversification
in 1993-6.
The comparison of US and East Asian firms suggests several stylized facts. First, US firms
diversify into one or two segments which are relatively unrelated to their main business
segment, either vertically or complementarily. This trend is not observed for East Asian or
Japanese corporations. We do not have any a priori reason as to why we observe this
divergence of diversification patterns. Second, the number of segments of US firms is less
than that of East Asian firms. However, as reported in Lang and Stulz (1994) and
Comment and Jarrell (1995), the average number of segments for US firms in 1970s and
1980s was around 2.0 to 2.5, which is similar to that of East Asian countries in 1990s.
While a direct comparison with our findings is inappropriate as we define segments at the
2-digit SIC level, it does suggest a 10- to 20-year time lag for East Asian firms in terms of
diversification trends. Third, Table 4 shows a decrease in the number of segments in the
US accompanied with more complementary diversification. In contrast, Japanese firms
increased their diversification levels, expanding into both vertically related and
complementary businesses. Companies in East Asia also expand into more lines of
businesses during 1993-6, and this expansion leads to a mild increase in complementary
diversification.
4. Diversification and valuation
4.1 Valuation measurement
We use the Berger and Ofek (1995) measure for corporate value. We define it as the
natural logarithm of the ratio of the firm’s actual market value to its imputed value. We use
the market value of common equity plus the book value of debt at the end of 1996 as the
measure of actual market value. The imputed value is computed following the industry-
matching scheme. We first compute the median market-valuation-to-sales ratio¾market
capitalization divided by firm sales¾for each industry in each country using only single
segment firms. We then multiply the level of sales in each segment of a firm by its
corresponding industry median market-to-sales ratio. The imputed value of the firm is
obtained by summing the multiples across all segments. We construct the excess value by
comparing the valuation of a specific firm with the median of the industry where this firm
belongs. In doing so, we remove the industry effect.
We restrict the number of single segment firms to at least three when computing the
median market-to-sales ratio of an industry. When an industry has fewer than three single
segment firms, even defined broadly as Campbell (1996), we use the median of all firms in
the country. This procedure avoids the loss of observations. However, the industry
matching procedure could introduce bias in the excess value measure. The bias is inversely
related to the availability of single segment firms. For most firms in our sample, we are9
able to find matching single segment firms at the broad industry group level. We therefore
do not expect such bias to be significant.12
4.2 Univariate results
Table 5 reports the mean and median excess value, sorted by number of segments for
individual countries ranked by their respective per capita GNP in 1997. Consistent with
Lang and Stulz (1994), we document for US firms that excess value, both mean and
median, decreases with the number of segments. We do not observe, however, a similar
monotonically decreasing trend for the other nine countries. However, comparing two
segment firms with single segment firms, we do observe a mean (median) valuation
decline for six (seven) of the nine East Asian countries. To conduct a non-parametric test,
we count the number of positive mean excess values for multisegment firms for each
country. We do not find any positive mean excess value in the US, but 36 percent of the
mean excess values are positive in East Asia. In terms of median excess values, none are
positive for the US, but 44 percent of median excess values are positive in the East Asian
countries. Thus, while the evidence that diversification is associated with lower valuation
for US firm is strong, we find similar evidence for East Asian firms comparing single- with
two segment firms. The results are mixed for multisegment firms in East Asia, however.
Table 6 reports the mean and median excess value sorted by vertical relatedness for
individual countries. We document a substantial variation in excess value among countries.
In particular, we document striking evidence that seven countries (Japan, Singapore, the
US, Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia) experienced lower excess value for firms
with more vertically diversified segments. The mean (median) excess value for these seven
countries for the highest degree of vertical integration varies from –17.86 (-19.11) percent
to -56.69 (-129.09) percent. Moreover, all six countries except for Korea have low excess
value for the second largest vertical degree of integration, with mean (median) excess
values between -12.55 (-12.89) percent to -68.15 (-75.50) percent. We do not find lower
mean excess values for lower degrees of vertical diversification (except for our vertical
relatedness measure between 0.005 and 0.01 in the Philippines). This evidence supports the
notion that excessive vertical diversification hurts performance in most countries. Table 7
reports the mean and median excess value sorted by the degree of complementarity for
individual countries, again ranked by their respective per capita GNP. We find some
variation in excess value relative to the degree of complementarity among individual
countries. In particular, increasing complementarity is associated with higher value in
several countries, but this association is not monotonic.
To identify systematic patterns across East Asian countries relative to the US, we classify
East Asian countries into a lower-middle income group, including Indonesia, the
Philippines and Thailand, a higher-middle income countries including Korea and Malaysia,
and a high income group including Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan.13 We do
not have low-income group for East Asian countries. This income grouping has been used
in La Porta et al. (1997) and Fauver et al. (1999).
12 We require that each segment have segment sales information, hence the practice of consolidation of
accounting information will not affect the computation of our performance measure.
13 We follow the standard World Bank classification of income level. This creates some borderline cases.
For example, Taiwan is in the high income group but its per capita income is only US$13,198 which is a little
higher than Korea in the higher middle income group, whose per capita income is US$10,550.10
Table 8, Panel A reports the mean and median excess values sorted by number of
segments, vertical relatedness and complementarity for each income group including the
US, a high income group without the US, a higher-middle income group and a lower-
middle income group. In Panel A, we observe a monotonically decreasing mean and
median excess value for US firms as the number of segments increases. We also find that
for the lower-middle income groups mean (median) excess value turns negative for three-
and more-segment (four and five segment) firms. For the higher-middle income group, we
observe positive mean and median excess values for firms with three and four segments,
suggesting that diversification does not lead to lower valuation for these firms. We find
higher mean negative excess values for firms with two, three and four segments in the high
income group, with the mean excess value for firms with five or more segments similar to
single segment firms. The evidence that diversification does not necessarily hurt valuation
for East Asian firms is consistent with findings for US firms in 1960s and 1970s; Hubbard
and Palia (1999), for example, document diversification premia for US firms in 1960s and
1970s, while Servaes (1996) finds discounts in the 1960s and premia in the 1970s. This
evidence suggests a similarity of the effect of diversification on valuation of East Asian
firms with US firms but with a 10 to 20 year time lag. It complements our prior findings on
the pattern of diversification in East Asia.
Panel B reports the mean and median excess values by the degree of vertical relatedness
and income groups. Consistent with the evidence reported in Table 6, we document a
sizable negative excess value for more vertically related diversification for the higher-
middle and lower-middle income groups, with the mean (median) excess values for degree
of vertical relatedness between 0.02 and 0.03 negative 52 (73) percent and 48 (40) percent
respectively. Moreover, the mean (median) excess values for higher-middle income and
lower-middle income groups are a negative 29 (24) percent and 18 (43) percent for degrees
of vertical relatedness more than 0.03. In contrast, we find negative mean and median
excess values between 12 to 20 percent for degrees of vertical relatedness above 0.02 for
US firms. For the high-income group without the US, we find less evidence of higher
negative excess value for higher degrees of vertical relatedness. In contrast, excess value
increases at lower levels of vertical relatedness for the US and high-income countries.
Panel C reports the mean and median excess value by degree of complementarity for each
income groups. We fail to observe any significant pattern in mean or median excess values
for any income group.
A natural question can be raised as to why corporations diversify, if this diversification
hurts performance. It casts doubt on the rationality of corporate business strategy. One
sensible answer could be that US firms have shed their unprofitable unrelated segments
over time as part of a more focused corporate strategy. This action concurrently increases
the relative degree of complementary integration of the remaining business.
4.3 Regression results
Valuation Effects of Diversification
We first examine whether there are diversification discounts across the ten countries.
Country by country, we regress the natural logarithm of the excess value (EXV) on
diversification level, controlling for firm size (Log(ASSETS)), measured as the natural11
logarithm of firm assets in constant US dollar.14 All of the regressions also control for
fixed-year effects. Table 9 reports the OLS regression results of the following regression:
EXV = a + b1*SEGN + b2*Log(ASSETS) + (Fixed-year effects) + u
In Panel A, the diversification level of a firm is captured by a dummy variable. It equals
one if the firm has multiple segments, zero otherwise. In Panel B, the diversification level
is alternatively measured as the firm’s number of segments.
From Panel A, we find statistically significant diversification discounts, as indicated by the
negative estimated coefficients of the diversification dummy variable, for firms from Japan
(-4 percent), US (-16 percent), Taiwan (-14 percent), and Indonesia (-15 percent). On the
other hand, we are able to identify diversification premia for firms in Hong Kong and the
Philippines though those are not significant. When the diversification level is measured by
the segment number, the results hold for all countries except for Japan and Singapore
(Panel B). In the Japan regression, the coefficient of the segment number is negative but
insignificant. In the Singapore regression, the coefficient of the segment number is
significantly negative. The overall results suggest that diversification diminishes firm value
in Indonesia, Japan, Singapore, Taiwan, and the United States. In contrast, firm value is
insensitive to diversification level for firms in the other countries. Note that the t-statistics
for diversification level of all East Asian countries is drastically lower than that of the US.
Our results are broadly consistent with the findings in previous studies, e.g., Fauver et al.
(1999) and Lins and Servaes (1999b) who find smaller diversification discounts in the
poorer countries.
The valuation effects of relatedness
We next examine the effects of relatedness on firm value. We perform the following OLS
regressions for each of the ten countries:
EXV = a + b1*V + b2*C + b3*SEGN + b4*Log(ASSETS) + (fixed-year effects) + u
where EXV is the excess value, V is the vertical relatedness measure, and C is the
complementarity measure. The explanatory variables also include the number of firm
segments (SEGN) and the natural logarithm of firm assets in thousands of US dollar
(Log(ASSETS)) to control for segment and size effects. Lastly, we include year dummy
variables to control for any fixed effects that may exist, while not reported. Since we
include vertical relatedness and complementarity in our regression, we only include
multisegment firms in the regression. The regression is performed on the pooled sample of
firms on a country-by-country basis.
Table 10 presents the regression results for the US and the nine Asian countries. The
estimated coefficients of vertical relatedness are negative in five country regressions:
Singapore, Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia. Three of them (Korea, Malaysia, and
14 To be consistent with prior studies including Berger and Ofek (1995) and Fauver et al. (1999), we also
control for operating income and capital expenditure for all regressions in Table 9 and Table 10. It is always
an open question whether to include operating income in regressions since the diversification may affect
value through operating income. However if we include operating income, results remain the same. If we
include capital expenditure, we lose about 40 percent of the firms in East Asia. Since the consequence of
reducing the sample is serious, we drop it from the regressions.12
Indonesia) are statistically significant. For two other East Asian countries (the Philippines
and Taiwan), the coefficients of vertical relatedness are positive but insignificant. Japan
and Hong Kong are the only East Asian countries where excess values increase with
vertical relatedness and the estimated coefficients of vertical relatedness are significant at
the 5 percent level. The regression results for East Asian firms are consistent with the
univariate results reported earlier. In particular, we observe a large decline in value as
the degree of vertical relatedness increases for firms the same five East Asian countries.
The positive coefficient for Hong Kong is consistent with that in Table 6 where we observe
an increasing value for a higher degree of vertical relatedness. We also observe a
significant positive coefficient for Japanese firms in Table 10. The regression results for
US firms differ from the univariate statistics where values are lowest for US firms with
either the highest or lowest degree of vertical relatedness. The positive coefficient on V
results from variation in the lower ranges of vertical relatedness. There appears to be a
nonlinear relation between excess value and V for firms in the United States.
The statistics in Table 7 did not reveal any systematic relation between complementarity
and excess value. The regression analysis identifies some significant patterns. Overall,
complementary diversification is not detrimental to value. The estimated coefficients of
complementarity for East Asian firms are significantly positive for Japan, Singapore and
Korea at the five-percent level, weakly negative (at the 10 percent level) for Malaysia and
Thailand, and insignificant for other East Asian countries. The estimated coefficient of
complementarity for US firms is positive and statistically significant at the one-percent
level. These results are interesting in several aspects. First, we do not observe as significant
negative impact on value for complementary diversification as we do for vertical related
diversification. Second, both vertical relatedness and complementarity appear to be
associated with higher value increases for more developed countries as we observe positive
significant coefficients for Japan, Singapore, the US and Korea. Third, while we observed
a concave relationship in Table 7 between complementarity and value for US firms, the
regression coefficient is positive and significant.
We next examine the effects of multiple segments on excess value. The regression
coefficients are significantly negative for Singapore, the US, Hong Kong, and Malaysia.
The coefficients are insignificant for Taiwan, Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, and
Indonesia. Lastly, the coefficient for Japan is significantly positive. Given that a firm has
multiple segments, the number of segments have different impacts on valuation among
countries. These results are different from those in Table 9 where single- and multisegment
firms are both included in the analysis. The differences are mainly due to single segment
firms. When compared with single segment firms, multiple segment firms tend to have
poorer performance, as suggested by the results in Table 9. Comparing between one and
two segment firms, two segment firms in six (seven) out of the nine East Asian countries
have lower mean (median) excess value. But among the multisegment firms, the relation
between excess value and segment number diverges across countries. From Table 5 we
also see that, in the multisegment firm sample, the relation between value and segment
number are often nonlinear, suggesting that one should be cautious in interpreting the
coefficients on the segment number in Table 10.
The overall results show that vertical integration weakens firm value for most developing
economies in East Asia, complementary diversification increases firm value in most East
Asian countries, and diversification in terms of the number of segments lowers firm values
in several East Asian countries. The negative effect of vertical relatedness in East Asia may13
be the result of earlier government attempts to induce rapid industrialization. This
hypothesis is consistent with the findings in Rodrik (1997).
We find evidence that complementary diversification improves valuation for Japan,
Singapore, and Korea. This evidence is consistent with Penrose (1959) and Teece (1980,
1982) who argue that complementary diversification allows firms to realize benefits
associated with the utilization of non-contractible resources through the joint procurement
of human or physical inputs or the sharing of marketing and distribution activities. Our
evidence is also consistent with the view in Scharfstein and Stein (1997), Shin and Stulz
(1998), and Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (1999) who argue that it is the heterogeneity in
investment opportunities across diversified firms’ segments which induces capital
misallocation and diversification discounts. As higher complementarity implies lower
heterogeneity in procurement and marketing, one would expect relatively higher valuation
for complementary diversification. The positive valuation effects of vertical and
complementary diversification in the United States are driven by downsizing, i.e.,
divestitures of unrelated assets. This finding is consistent with Schlingemann, Stulz, and
Walkling (1999) who discover similar divestiture patterns in a sample of US companies.
5. Conclusions
Our evidence suggests eight stylized facts about the diversification patterns and valuation
effects of diversification in the ten sample countries. First, US firms diversify less than
firms in Japan and the eight East Asian countries. The intersegment relatedness of US
firms is weaker, however. Second, we document a trend of reduced diversification in the
United States, but not in the other nine countries. Third, vertical relatedness increased over
time for Japanese firms, but did not change for firms in the US or East Asia. Fourth,
complementary diversification increased over time in all sample countries. Fifth, the
increase in relatedness for US firms is due to the divestiture of unrelated assets. In contrast,
the increase in relatedness for firms in Japan and East Asia is due to expansion into related
businesses. Sixth, and consistent with prior studies, diversification diminishes corporate
value in the US, but not so for most other sample countries. Seventh, vertical
diversification enhances value in the more developed countries, but diminishes value in the
poorer countries or the countries with less developed financial systems. Finally,
complementary relatedness generally does not have an effect on value, and even enhances
corporate value in several sample countries.
There are several conjectures that warrant further research. First, it is not clear whether the
differences in diversification patterns between East Asian firms and US firms represent a
‘normal’ 10 to 20 year time lag of East Asian firms in both diversification patterns and
effect on value. Second, we argue that corporations in the United States have adopted
focused strategy to get rid of non-profitable unrelated segments. This action in turn
increases the vertical or complementary integration and also allows us to observe a
simultaneous performance decline. Third, the reasons behind the relationship for US firms
between vertical relatedness, complementarity, on the one hand, and firm value, on the
other hand, opens some further research areas.15
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Japan 37850 6599 0.67 2796 3219 0.33 2248
Singapore 32940 358 0.72 518 140 0.28 723
USA 28740 7825 0.20 3365 31731 0.80 686
Hong Kong 25280 473 0.66 1110 243 0.34 889
Taiwan 13198 125 0.47 802 140 0.53 739
Korea (South) 10550 319 0.64 1590 177 0.36 2338
Malaysia 4682 535 0.70 607 229 0.30 542
Thailand 2800 133 0.26 574 373 0.74 302
Philippines 1220 38 0.33 486 78 0.67 341
Indonesia 1110 117 0.47 670 130 0.53 364
All countries (excl. USA) 8697 0.65 2331 4729 0.35 1773
All countries 16522 0.31 2822 36460 0.69 827
Source and Note: The sample spans the period of 1990-6. The primary data source of the East Asian firms is Worldscope, amended by Asian/Japan Company
Handbook. The data source of the US firms is COMPUSTAT. The sample excludes firms whose segment data are missing and firms primarily in the finance
industry (SIC 6000-6999). Company segments are defined at the two digit SIC code level. Firms are classified as single segment if at least 90 percent of their total




Summary statistics of multisegment firms' segment number, vertical relatedness, and
complementarity
Per capita GNP Number Mean Median Std. Error Minimum Maximum
Panel A: number of segments
Japan 37850 6599 3.2250 3.0000 1.0860 2.0000 8.0000
Singapore 32940 358 3.7541 4.0000 1.2816 2.0000 7.0000
USA 28740 7825 2.5389 2.0000 0.8244 2.0000 8.0000
Hong Kong 25280 473 3.7399 4.0000 1.3220 2.0000 9.0000
Taiwan 13198 125 2.8880 3.0000 0.9522 2.0000 7.0000
Korea (South) 10550 319 2.7429 3.0000 0.8027 2.0000 6.0000
Malaysia 4682 535 4.0168 4.0000 1.6471 2.0000 10.0000
Thailand 2800 133 2.7218 2.0000 0.9797 2.0000 6.0000
Philippines 1220 38 3.3947 3.0000 1.4433 2.0000 7.0000
Indonesia 1110 117 3.1965 3.0000 1.3341 2.0000 9.0000
All countries 16522 2.9362 3.0000 1.0913 2.0000 10.0000
Panel B: vertical relatedness
Japan 37850 5750 0.0052 0.0021 0.0077 0.0000 0.0366
Singapore 32940 345 0.0077 0.0039 0.0093 0.0000 0.0366
USA 28740 7442 0.0043 0.0016 0.0070 0.0000 0.0363
Hong Kong 25280 450 0.0077 0.0037 0.0091 0.0000 0.0366
Taiwan 13198 69 0.0026 0.0015 0.0046 0.0000 0.0359
Korea (South) 10550 160 0.0048 0.0020 0.0080 0.0000 0.0366
Malaysia 4682 497 0.0057 0.0022 0.0077 0.0000 0.0359
Thailand 2800 109 0.0094 0.0051 0.0106 0.0000 0.0359
Philippines 1220 35 0.0047 0.0026 0.0078 0.0001 0.0359
Indonesia 1110 106 0.0076 0.0036 0.0095 0.0000 0.0359
All countries 14963 0.0049 0.0019 0.0075 0.0000 0.0366
Panel C: complementarity
Japan 37850 5750 0.2053 0.1526 0.1867 0.0088 1.0000
Singapore 32940 345 0.2336 0.1750 0.1709 0.0412 1.0000
USA 28740 7442 0.1501 0.1217 0.1035 0.0111 0.6833
Hong Kong 25280 450 0.2311 0.1866 0.1894 0.0179 1.0000
Taiwan 13198 69 0.1828 0.1335 0.2174 0.0158 1.0000
Korea (South) 10550 160 0.1490 0.1305 0.1334 0.0056 1.0000
table continues…22
Malaysia 4682 497 0.1468 0.1023 0.1395 0.0116 1.0000
Thailand 2800 109 0.2140 0.1781 0.1593 0.0378 0.6833
Philippines 1220 35 0.1505 0.0919 0.1394 0.0379 0.6221
Indonesia 1110 106 0.2539 0.1215 0.2639 0.0087 1.0000
All countries 14963 0.1769 0.1338 0.1522 0.0568 1.0000
Source and Note: The sample includes multisegment firms and spans the period of 1990-6. Company
segments are defined at the two digit SIC code level. The primary data source of the East Asian firms is
Worldscope, amended by Asian/Japan Company Handbook. The data source of the US firms is
COMPUSTAT. The sample excludes firms whose segment data are missing and firms primarily in the finance
industry (SIC 6000-6999). Vertical relatedness and complementarity are defined in the text. They are
constructed from the segment data and the commodity-flow data in the Use Table of the 1992 Benchmark
Input-Output Accounts for US Economy.22
Table 3
Distribution of multisegment firms by segment number, vertical relatedness, and complementarity
Japan Singapore USA Hong
Kong
Taiwan S. Korea Malaysia Thailand Philippines Indonesia All
countries
Panel A: Segment number
Number of firms
SEG=2 1883 73 4855 87 50 142 122 72 12 42 7338
SEG=3 2422 79 2024 139 49 128 101 38 12 38 5030
SEG=4 1504 111 745 123 19 39 112 14 8 21 2696
SEG>=5 790 95 201 124 7 10 200 9 6 16 1458
Percentage
SEG=2 0.29 0.20 0.62 0.18 0.40 0.45 0.23 0.54 0.32 0.36 0.44
SEG=3 0.37 0.22 0.26 0.29 0.39 0.40 0.19 0.29 0.32 0.32 0.30
SEG=4 0.23 0.31 0.10 0.26 0.15 0.12 0.21 0.11 0.21 0.18 0.16
SEG>=5 0.12 0.27 0.03 0.26 0.06 0.03 0.37 0.07 0.16 0.14 0.09
Panel B: Vertical relatedness
Number of firms
V<0.005 4218 207 5695 254 60 122 339 54 26 67 11042
0.005<=V<0.01 669 48 954 77 7 16 68 21 7 15 1882
0.01<=V<0.02 375 54 377 64 1 11 45 16 0 10 953
0 . 0 2 < = V < 0 . 0 3 3 2 3 1 4 2 2 0 3 103 3 6600 6 5 1
0 . 0 3 < = V 1 6 5 2 2 1 9 6 2 4189 1 220 4 4 5
Percentage
V<0.005 0.73 0.60 0.77 0.56 0.87 0.76 0.68 0.50 0.74 0.73 0.74
0.005<=V<0.01 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.17 0.10 0.10 0.14 0.19 0.20 0.16 0.13
0.01<=V<0.02 0.07 0.16 0.05 0.14 0.01 0.07 0.09 0.15 0.00 0.11 0.06
0.02<=V<0.03 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.04






C<0.1 1411 83 2421 113 30 56 245 27 19 36 4441
0.1<=C<0.2 2472 101 3502 131 26 76 144 39 10 30 6531
0.2<=C<0.3 941 63 886 100 4 18 48 19 3 11 2093
0.3<=C<0.4 417 42 438 51 1 7 38 8 1 4 1007
0.4<=C 509 56 195 55 8 3 22 16 2 25 891
Percentage
C<0.1 0.25 0.24 0.33 0.25 0.43 0.35 0.49 0.25 0.54 0.34 0.30
0.1<=C<0.2 0.43 0.29 0.47 0.29 0.38 0.48 0.29 0.36 0.29 0.28 0.44
0.2<=C<0.3 0.16 0.18 0.12 0.22 0.06 0.11 0.10 0.17 0.09 0.10 0.14
0.3<=C<0.4 0.07 0.12 0.06 0.11 0.01 0.04 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.07
0.4<=C 0.09 0.16 0.03 0.12 0.12 0.02 0.04 0.15 0.06 0.24 0.06
Source and Note: The sample includes multisegment firms and spans the period of 1990-6. Company segments are defined at the two digit SIC code level. The
primary data source of the East Asian firms is Worldscope, amended by Asian/Japan Company Handbook. The data source of the US firms is COMPUSTAT. The
sample excludes firms whose segment data are missing and firms primarily in the finance industry (SIC 6000-6999). Vertical relatedness and complementarity are





Patterns of the mean and median segment number, vertical relatedness, and complementarity
Period USA Japan Other East Asian economies
SEG V C SEG V C SEG V C
Panel A: Mean
1990 1.36 0.0042 0.1471 2.33 0.0041 0.2224 3.06 0.0049 0.1722
1991 1.34 0.0042 0.1475 2.44 0.0045 0.2035 3.30 0.0062 0.2182
1992 1.33 0.0043 0.1450 2.51 0.0052 0.2091 2.69 0.0066 0.2195
1993 1.31 0.0045 0.1520 2.49 0.0051 0.1992 2.30 0.0069 0.1658
1994 1.29 0.0043 0.1492 2.46 0.0053 0.2020 2.29 0.0064 0.2034
1995 1.27 0.0043 0.1554 2.49 0.0052 0.2026 2.45 0.0067 0.1965
1996 1.26 0.0046 0.1567 2.56 0.0055 0.2134 2.50 0.0071 0.1978
Change 1990-6 -0.10*** 0.0004 0.0096** 0.23** 0.0014* -0.0090 -0.56 0.0022 0.0256
Change 1993-6 -0.05*** 0.0001 0.0047 0.06 0.0004 0.0142* 0.20** 0.0002 0.032**
Panel B: Median
1990 1 0.0016 0.1207 2 0.0019 0.1464 3 0.0026 0.1239
1991 1 0.0015 0.1190 2 0.0020 0.1561 3 0.0037 0.1370
1992 1 0.0015 0.1206 2 0.0020 0.1561 2 0.0035 0.1561
1993 1 0.0016 0.1233 2 0.0020 0.1504 2 0.0033 0.1306
1994 1 0.0016 0.1217 2 0.0020 0.1503 2 0.0030 0.1561
1995 1 0.0016 0.1233 2 0.0021 0.1504 2 0.0031 0.1416




Change 1990-6 0*** 0.0000 0.0034 0.00 0.0002 0.0096 -1* 0.0005 0.0146
Change 1993-6 0*** 0.0000 0.0008 0.00 0.0001 0.0056 0* -0.0002 0.0079
Panel C: Number of firms
1990 4866 1085 1085 135 82 82 31 19 19
1991 5031 1067 1067 886 558 558 94 63 63
1992 5223 1060 1060 1098 702 702 210 125 125
1993 5648 1075 1075 1693 963 963 423 168 168
1994 6179 1101 1101 1913 1099 1099 710 307 307
1995 6659 1106 1106 2005 1154 1154 1050 517 517
1996 5950 939 939 2008 1192 1192 1090 572 572
Source and Note: Company segments (SEG) are defined at the two digit SIC code level. Vertical relatedness (V) and complementarity (C) are defined in thet e x t .
The sample includes single- and multisegment firms from the US, Japan, and eight East Asian economies including Hong Kong, Indonesia, South Korea,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand. The sample used to calculate the statistics of V and C includes only multisegment firms, while we use
combine single and multisegment firms to compute number of segments. The primary data source of the East Asian firms is Worldscope, amended by Asian/Japan
Company Handbook. The data source of the US firms is COMPUSTAT. The sample excludes firms whose segment data are missing and firms primarily in the
finance industry (SIC 6000-6999). V and C are constructed from the segment data and the commodity flow data in the Use Table of the 1992 Benchmark Input-




Mean and median excess value by segment number and country
Country SEG=1 SEG=2 SEG=3 SEG=4 SEG>=5
Panel A: Mean
Japan -0.0023 -0.0340 -0.0607 -0.0434 0.0257
Singapore -0.0198 -0.0593 0.0409 -0.0959 -0.2280
USA -0.0462 -0.1469 -0.2468 -0.2589 -0.3254
Hong Kong -0.0698 0.1270 -0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0252
Taiwan 0.0180 -0.1112 0.0674 -0.3060 -0.0983
Korea (South) -0.0155 -0.1469 -0.0171 0.0517 -0.4570
Malaysia -0.0030 -0.0640 0.1713 0.0615 -0.1370
Thailand 0.0338 0.0019 0.0669 0.0637 -0.2121
Philippines 0.0110 0.4245 -0.0245 -0.0662 0.3810
Indonesia 0.0622 0.0670 -0.1141 -0.1012 -0.0805
Panel B: Median
Japan 0.0020 -0.0608 -0.0661 -0.0429 0.0315
Singapore -0.0010 -0.0998 -0.0090 -0.0801 -0.2810
USA -0.0562 -0.1634 -0.2637 -0.2718 -0.3302
Hong Kong -0.0035 0.1722 -0.0100 0.0227 0.0025
Taiwan -0.0010 -0.0151 -0.0532 -0.3215 -0.1053
Korea (South) -0.0010 -0.1803 0.0113 0.0487 -0.5834
Malaysia -0.0010 -0.0460 0.1595 0.0305 -0.1887
Thailand 0.0000 -0.0855 0.1161 0.1422 -0.3012
Philippines 0.0000 0.3754 0.0816 0.0987 0.4134
Indonesia 0.0059 0.0397 -0.1663 -0.2046 0.1613
Source and Note: Excess value is the natural logarithm of the actual capital divided by imputed capital as defined
in the text. The sample includes single- and multisegment firms and spans the period of 1990-96. Company
segments are defined at the two digit SIC code level. The primary data source of the East Asian firms is
Worldscope, amended by Asian/Japan Company Handbook. The data source of the US firms is COMPUSTAT.
The sample excludes firms whose segment data are missing and firms primarily in the finance industry (SIC 6000-
6999).22
Table 6
Mean and median excess value by vertical relatedness and country
Country V<0.005 0.005<=V<0.01 0.01<=V<0.02 0.02<=V<0.03 V>=0.03
Panel A: Mean
Japan -0.0664 0.0098 -0.0014 0.0945 -0.0742
Singapore -0.0961 -0.1833 0.0191 -0.4409 -0.2176
USA -0.2163 -0.1559 -0.0283 -0.1255 -0.1786
Hong Kong 0.0032 -0.0244 0.0450 0.0642 0.2349
Taiwan -0.1172 0.1232 -0.3960 0.0000 0.0000
Korea (South) -0.0946 -0.0236 -0.0969 0.2761 -0.3644
Malaysia 0.0113 0.0410 0.0544 -0.5436 -0.2097
Thailand 0.0936 0.1019 0.0867 -0.2062 -0.2579
Philippines 0.2709 -0.7330 0.0000 0.0000 0.7890
Indonesia -0.0634 0.2637 0.1102 -0.6815 -0.5669
Panel B: Median
Japan -0.0758 -0.0100 0.0392 0.0563 -0.0181
Singapore -0.0812 -0.2891 -0.0493 -0.5259 -0.2843
USA -0.2473 -0.1769 0.0179 -0.1289 -0.1978
Hong Kong 0.0492 -0.0192 0.0667 0.1275 0.2254
Taiwan -0.1053 0.2199 -0.3960 0.0000 0.0000
Korea (South) -0.1244 0.0137 -0.0758 0.2761 -0.2836
Malaysia -0.0010 0.1070 0.0940 -0.7550 -0.1911
Thailand 0.1002 0.1955 -0.1205 -0.3210 -0.4354
Philippines 0.2525 -0.7812 0.0000 0.0000 0.7890
Indonesia -0.0932 0.0732 0.0361 -0.6350 -1.2909
Source and Note: Excess value is the natural logarithm of the actual capital divided by imputed capital as defined
in the text. The sample includes multisegment firms and spans the period of 1990-6. Company segments are
defined at the two digit SIC code level. The primary data source of the East Asian firms is Worldscope, amended
by Asian/Japan Company Handbook. The data source of the US firms is COMPUSTAT. The sample excludes
firms whose segment data are missing and firms primarily in the finance industry (SIC 6000-6999). Vertical
relatedness is defined in the text. They are constructed from the segment data and the commodity-flow data in the
Use Table of the 1992 Benchmark Input-Output Accounts for US Economy.22
Table 7
Mean and median excess value by complementarity and country
Country C<0.1 0.1<=C<0.2 0.2<=C<0.3 0.3<=C<0.4 C>=0.4
Panel A: Mean
Japan -0.0565 -0.0801 -0.0031 0.0034 -0.0030
Singapore -0.1459 -0.1779 -0.1026 -0.2187 0.1379
USA -0.2763 -0.1865 -0.0674 -0.1057 -0.1921
Hong Kong -0.0960 0.1096 0.0609 -0.1208 0.1132
Taiwan -0.0041 -0.1569 -0.1807 -0.3960 -0.0951
Korea (South) -0.2019 -0.0663 -0.1052 0.3479 0.0000
Malaysia 0.0689 -0.1624 -0.1725 0.0701 0.0044
Thailand -0.0967 0.0667 0.1876 -0.0030 0.0350
Philippines -0.1073 0.3884 0.3256 0.2327 0.0000
Indonesia -0.0485 -0.1814 0.0703 0.5862 -0.1705
Panel B: Median
Japan -0.0565 -0.0801 -0.0314 0.0034 -0.0030
Singapore -0.1020 -0.1131 -0.1767 -0.3368 0.1305
USA -0.3326 -0.1925 -0.0414 -0.1298 -0.1831
Hong Kong -0.0725 0.1488 0.1466 -0.2288 0.1693
Taiwan -0.0090 -0.0470 -0.1053 -0.3960 -0.3215
Korea (South) -0.2810 0.0202 -0.0910 0.4213 0.0000
Malaysia 0.0648 -0.1899 -0.2757 0.2421 0.0601
Thailand 0.0449 0.2135 0.1873 0.2768 -0.2771
Philippines -0.0307 0.2461 0.3987 0.2327 0.0000
Indonesia 0.0373 -0.3601 0.1517 0.8582 -0.2081
Source and Note: Excess value is the natural logarithm of the actual capital divided by imputed capital as defined
in the text. The sample includes multisegment firms and spans the period of 1990-6. Company segments are
defined at the two digit SIC code level. The primary data source of the East Asian firms is Worldscope, amended
by Asian/Japan Company Handbook. The data source of the US firms is COMPUSTAT. The sample excludes
firms whose segment data are missing and firms primarily in the finance industry (SIC 6000-6999).
Complementarity is defined in the text. They are constructed from the segment data and the commodity-flow data
in the Use Table of the 1992 Benchmark Input-Output Accounts for US Economy22
Table 8
Mean and median excess value by relatedness and income group




Panel A: Segment number
Mean
SEG=1 -0.0462 -0.0060 -0.0051 0.0369
SEG=2 -0.1469 -0.0308 -0.1086 0.0575
SEG=3 -0.2468 -0.0553 0.0652 -0.0237
SEG=4 -0.2589 -0.0463 0.0590 -0.0430
SEG>=5 -0.3254 -0.0038 -0.1523 -0.0115
Median
SEG=1 -0.0562 0.0000 -0.0010 0.0010
SEG=2 -0.1634 -0.0576 -0.1238 0.0227
SEG=3 -0.2637 -0.0597 0.0430 0.0382
SEG=4 -0.2718 -0.0455 0.0324 -0.0855
SEG>=5 -0.3302 0.0015 -0.1996 -0.0882
Panel B: Vertical relatedness
Mean
V<0.005 -0.2163 -0.0648 -0.0151 0.0478
0.005<=V<0.01 -0.1559 -0.0033 0.0274 0.0274
0.01<=V<0.02 -0.0283 0.0059 0.0277 0.0972
0.02<=V<0.03 -0.1255 0.0745 -0.5195 -0.4778
0.03<=V -0.1786 -0.0555 -0.2871 -0.1801
Median
V<0.005 -0.2473 -0.0725 -0.0502 0.0861
0.005<=V<0.01 -0.1769 -0.0171 0.0505 0.0732
0.01<=V<0.02 0.0179 0.0305 -0.0080 -0.0488
0.02<=V<0.03 -0.1289 0.0497 -0.7331 -0.3997
0.03<=V -0.1978 -0.0325 -0.2374 -0.4261
Panel C: Complementarity
Mean
C<0.1 -0.2763 -0.0811 0.0206 -0.0267
0.1<=C<0.2 -0.1865 -0.0710 -0.1299 0.0718
0.2<=C<0.3 -0.0674 0.0015 -0.1565 0.0583
table continues…22
0.3<=C<0.4 -0.1057 -0.0156 0.1242 0.2752
0.4<=C -0.1921 0.0639 0.0044 -0.2254
Median
C<0.1 -0.3326 -0.0576 0.0188 0.0373
0.1<=C<0.2 -0.1925 -0.0768 -0.1301 0.1239
0.2<=C<0.3 -0.0414 -0.0314 -0.2600 0.2088
0.3<=C<0.4 -0.1298 -0.0450 0.3121 0.3207
0.4<=C -0.1831 0.0227 0.0601 -0.2620
Source and Note: Excess value is the natural logarithm of the actual capital divided by imputed capital as defined
in the text. The sample includes multisegment firms and spans the period of 1990-6. The income grouping of the
Asian economies is according to the World Bank definition. The high-income group includes Hong Kong, Japan,
Singapore, and Taiwan. The higher-middle income group includes South Korea and Malaysia. The lower-middle
income group includes Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. The primary data source of the East Asian firms
is Worldscope, amended by Asian/Japan Company Handbook. The data source of the US firms is COMPUSTAT.
The sample excludes firms whose segment data are missing and firms primarily in the finance industry (SIC 6000-
6999). Vertical relatedness and complementarity are defined in the text. They are constructed from the segment
data and the commodity-flow data in the Use Table of the 1992 Benchmark Input-Output Accounts for US
Economy.Table 9
OLS regressions of excess value on diversification levels
Japan Singapore USA Hong Kong Taiwan Korea Malaysia Thailand Philippines Indonesia
Panel A
Intercept -0.2066*** 0.1878 -0.1715*** -0.8748*** 0.8626** 0.0959 0.4677** -0.9347*** -0.3426 -2.2647***
(-3.05) (0.68) (-8.06) (-2.99) (2.24) (0.38) (2.02) (-3.57) (-0.65) (-5.36)
Diversification dummy -0.0401*** -0.0826 -0.1624*** 0.076 -0.1353** -0.0687 -0.0051 -0.0605 0.1169 -0.1492*
(-3.61) (-1.34) (-17.86) (1.39) (-2.30) (-1.39) (-0.09) (-0.95) (0.92) (-1.65)
Log(ASSETS) 0.0175*** -0.0158 0.0128*** 0.0624*** -0.0656** -0.0004 -0.04** 0.0812*** 0.0316 0.1882***
(4.82) (-0.72) (7.50) (3.30) (-2.25) (-0.21) (-2.41) (3.74) (0.73) (5.51)
Adjusted R2 0.0038 0.0013 0.0101 0.0163 0.0263 0.0088 0.0004 0.0288 -0.0198 0.1183
Observations 9458 442 32197 615 244 443 681 435 96 208
Panel B
Intercept -0.2154*** 0.1215 -0.0989*** -0.8675*** 0.8255** 0.0928 0.4112* -0.9151*** -0.3670 -2.1894***
(-3.18) (0.44) (-4.63) (-2.96) (2.14) (0.36) (1.74) (-3.52) (-0.69) (-5.14)
Number of segment(s) -0.0059 -0.0408** -0.0961*** -0.0007 -0.0533** -0.0108 -0.0162 -0.0369 0.0251 -0.0613*
(-1.56) (-2.40) (-19.09) (-0.46) (-2.05) (-0.47) (-1.19) (-1.15) (0.59) (-1.73)
Log(ASSETS) 0.0172*** -0.0055 0.0144*** 0.0666*** -0.0597** -0.0051 -0.0314 0.0828*** 0.0332 0.1863***
(4.73) (-0.24) (8.37) (3.43) (-2.02) (-0.27) (-1.59) (3.97) (0.75) (5.47)
Adjusted R2 0.0027 0.0103 0.0114 0.0135 0.0219 0.0049 0.0024 0.0297 -0.0254 0.1194
Observations 9458 442 32197 615 244 443 681 435 96 208
Source and Note: This table reports the OLS regressions of excess value on diversification levels. The sample includes single- and multisegment firms from ten economies as
indicated in the table. The dependent variable, EXV, is the excess value defined as the natural logarithm of the ratio of a firm's actual value to its imputed value. In Panel A,
diversification level is defined as a dummy variable equal to one if a firm has more than one segment, and otherwise zero. In Panel B, diversification level is defined as the
number of the firm's segment(s). All regressions control for fixed-year effects (not reported) and firm size (Log(ASSETS)), defined as the natural logarithm of firm assets in




OLS regressions of excess value on vertical relatedness, complementarity, and number of segments
Japan Singapore USA Hong Kong Taiwan Korea Malaysia Thailand Philippines Indonesia
Intercept -0.4573*** 0.2913 -0.2321*** -1.0642*** 1.1398 0.5187 0.5074 -0.0285 -2.4328* -2.1025***
(-5.14) (0.88) (-4.91) (-2.66) (1.03) (0.95) (1.61) (-0.04) (-1.73) (-2.88)
Vertical relatedness 3.7337*** -5.0542 3.4719*** 7.883** 20.1386 -12.4565** -17.008*** -10.6810 9.5291 -13.1357*
(V) (3.91) (-1.38) (3.38) (2.09) (0.57) (-2.13) (-3.93) (-1.52) (0.61) (-1.63)
Complementarity 0.0973** 0.4075** 0.3212*** 0.0324 -0.3756 2.0787*** -0.3724* -0.7763* 1.998 0.0373
(C) (2.49) (2.16) (4.45) (0.18) (-1.03) (3.49) (-1.68) (-1.79) (1.28) (0.14)
Number of segments 0.0147** -0.0526* -0.0683*** -0.0764*** -0.0299 -0.0685 -0.0549** 0.0009 -0.0374 0.0076
(SEGN) (2.29) (-1.89) (-7.56) (-2.79) (-0.35) (-1.11) (-2.43) (0.01) (-0.41) (0.11)
Log(ASSETS) 0.0205*** -0.0199 0.0151*** 0.1057*** -0.0913 -0.0431 -0.0179 0.0247 0.1902* 0.167***
(4.37) (-0.70) (4.81) (3.92) (-1.07) (-1.18) (-0.65) (0.44) (1.72) (3.12)
Adjusted R2 0.0099 0.0419 0.015 0.0468 -0.0511 0.0633 0.048 0.0058 0.0127 0.0981
Observations 5546 310 6728 395 57 134 444 92 28 91
Source and Note: This table reports the OLS regression results of the following regression model: EXV = a + b1*V + b2*C + b3*SEGN + b4*Log(ASSETS) + (Fixed-year effects) +
u. The sample includes multisegment firms from the ten economies as indicated in the table. The dependent variable, EXV, is the excess value defined as the natural logarithm
of the ratio of a firm's actual value to its imputed value. Among the independent variables, V is the vertical relatedness measure, C is the complementarity measure, SEGN is
the number of segments, and Log(ASSETS) is the natural logarithm of firm assets in thousands of US dollar. The vertical relatedness and complementarity variables are
constructed from the commodity flows data in the Use Table of the 1992 Benchmark US Input-Output Accounts. The details of the variable definition are described in the text. T-




Reporting Requirements on Segment Data
Country Mandatory Reported Segment Data Source of Information
Japan Sales Revenue, Net Income, Operating Expenditures Business Accounting Deliberation Council, 1995, Implementation Guide for
Certified Public Accountants, Tokyo, Japan, can be viewed at
http://www.jipca.or.jp/n_eng/index.html
Singapore Sales Revenue, Net Income, Operating
Expenditures, Total Assets, Fixed Assets
Ng, Eng Juan, 1994, Statements of Accounting Standard (Singapore), Longman
Singapore Publishers; can also be viewed at http://www.accountants.org.sg
USA Sales Revenue, Net Income, Total Assets International Accounting Standards Committee, International Accounting
Standard 14 (Revised), can be viewed at
http://www.iasc.org.uk/frame/cen2_114.htm
Hong Kong Sales Revenue, Net Income, Operating Expenditures Hong Kong Society of Accountants, Accounting Guideline 2.206, ‘Reporting
Financial Information by Segment’, can be viewed at
http://www.hksa.org.hk/hksa/profpron
Taiwan Sales Revenue, Net Income T.N. Soong and Co., 1992, The Accounting Profession in Taiwan, Republic of
China, American Institute for Certified Public Accountants, New York.
Korea (South) Sales Revenue, Operating Expenditures Korea Accounting Standards Board, 1998, Accounting in Korea, can be viewed
at http://msm.byu.edu/c&i/cim/account/Korea.htm#segment
Malaysia Sales Revenue, Net Income, Operating Expenditures Malaysian Accounting Standards Board, 1997, Financial Reporting Act, can be
viewed at http://www.jaring.my/grapr/html/masb.html
Thailand Sales Revenue, Net Income Institute of Certified Accountants and Auditors of Thailand, 1996, Accounting
Principles, can be viewed at http://www.icaat.or.th/menueng.html
Philippines Sales Revenue Accounting Standards Council of the Philippine Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, 1997, Compliance with Philippine GAAP, Manila.
Indonesia Sales Revenue, Net Income Komite Standar Akuntaksi Keuangan, 1996, Statement of Financial Accounting
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